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ABSTRACT
Ahead of upcoming elections, expectations ran high in 2013 across the archipelago
for a highly pluralistic electorate. With China as a leading trading partner, the
backdrop for Indonesia was steady economic growth, albeit checked by a sliding
currency, a current account deficit, and a depressing culture of corruption. Mixing
commerce and geopolitics, China, the U.S., and Japan all turned to Indonesia to
expand their influence.
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INTRODUCTION
An often-remarked, decade-long economic boom largely keyed to China’s
demand for Indonesia’s natural resources has also spawned the rise of
political-military-business oligarchs (certain of them well-established dynas-
ties) alongside the emergence of the super rich. Typically, such freewheeling
oligarchs use wealth to gain office unfairly. They also sidestep the law through
corrupt practices or by causing environmental disasters,1 e.g., through illegal
land clearing, logging, or mining practices, primarily on Sumatra and Kali-
mantan. According to the findings of the International Consortium of Inves-
tigative Journalists, nine of Indonesia’s richest families are worth a total of
US$36 billion, owning a combined 190 offshore companies and trusts. Not all
of them are parvenus, with six of these families linked to former presidents.2
But, as discussed below, political oligarchs, political ‘‘tribes,’’ or, in newer guise,
GEOFFREY C. GUNN is Professor Emeritus of the Faculty of Economics at Nagasaki University in
Japan. Email: <nagasaki.gunn@gmail.com>.
1. Jeffrey A. Winters, Oligarchy (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. xv, 192.
2. Toh Han Shih, ‘‘Offshore Links of Malaysia’s Rich,’’ South China Morning Post, April 11, 2013.
Asian Survey, Vol. 54, Number 1, pp. 47–55. ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X. © 2014 by
the Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission
to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights and
Permissions website, http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: 10.1525/AS.2014.54.1.47.
47
as long ago described by Clifford Geertz and Herbert Feith, ‘‘political aliran
(streams)’’ also latch onto populists to boost their appeal. By contrast, populist
politics in Indonesia springs from the grassroots organizations that have pro-
liferated in the post-reformasi (reform) era. These include a range of advocacy
groups and agencies, not excluding the Corruption Eradication Commission
(Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK), co-winner of the 2013 Manila-based
Ramon Magsaysay Prize for ‘‘emergent leadership,’’ and slated as ‘‘fiercely
independent.’’
DOMESTIC POLITICAL EVENTS
With presidential elections looming in July 2014 after parliamentary elections
in April, and with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono now serving a sec-
ond and final term, would-be candidates and parties are already flexing their
muscles. Among them is the ruling Democratic Party (part of a six-party
coalition), albeit sullied by corruption, for example, in the Hambalang Sports
Complex funding case in West Java, in which money may have been diverted
to fund the Party’s 2010 congress. Under the 2009 Presidential Election Law,
political parties must have at least 20% of the seats in the House of Repre-
sentatives or win 25% of the votes in the legislative election in order to be
eligible to nominate a presidential candidate. Such electoral and parliamen-
tary thresholds facilitate the rise of personalism, family dynasties, and political
‘‘tribes’’ to the detriment of aspirants lacking money or patronage.
Consistently heading the popularity or ‘‘electability’’ polls for the presi-
dential race is Joko ‘‘Jokowi’’ Widodo, Jakarta’s down-to-earth reformist
governor and champion ‘‘populist,’’ known for his pro-poor policies as well
as his penchant for loud rock music.3 According to Jonathan Chen and Adhi
Priamarizki, in reacting against a general elitist style of post-reformasi politics,
the so-called Jokowi effect suggests the public’s preference for a ‘‘more genial
and consultative form of personalism.’’4 As explained by political analyst
3. One index of Jokowi’s popularity among youth was surely the exuberant reception by 50,000
‘‘metalhead’’ fans at a concert by the Los Angeles-based Metallica rock group at the ‘‘Bung Karno’’
Stadium in Jakarta on August 25, 2013. See ‘‘Tiga Kali Nama Jokowi Menggema di Konser Metallica’’
[Three times Jokowi’s name resounded at the Metallica concert], <http://www.tribunnews.com/
seleb/2013/08/26/tiga-kali-nama-jokowi-menggema-di-konser-metallica>.
4. Jonathan Chen and Adhi Priamarizki, ‘‘Indonesia’s Democratic Evolution: Political Engi-
neering Post-Reformasi,’’ RSIS [Rajaratnam School of International Studies] Commentary 162/2013,
<http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS1622013.pdf>.
48  ASIAN SURVEY 54:1
Christianto Wibisono, presidential hopefuls without the backing of one of
Indonesia’s political dynasties or ‘‘tribes’’ appear to stand little chance of
winning next year’s race, as members of the Sukarno, Suharto, and Jokowi
networks position themselves for office.5 Jokowi, in turn, is linked with the
opposition Indonesia Democracy Party-Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indone-
sia Perjuangan, PDI-P) led by former President Megawati Sukarnoputri, and
the attraction appears to be mutual. Next in the popularity polls is Prabowo
Subianto, chairman of the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra), and
a former Army Special Forces (Kopassus) commander with a tainted record
for human rights abuses. Just as Jokowi has linked up with Megawati, Pra-
bowo is also seeking a patron. Otherwise, the Prabowo family business
extends to younger brother Hashim Djojohadikusumo, the 23rd richest Indo-
nesian, with a net worth of $910 million.6 Golkar Party chairman and chief
financier Aburizal Bakrie, and retired General Wiranto, chairman of the
People’s Conscience Party (Hanura), among others, are no less connected.
Bakrie heads the list of Indonesia’s super rich. In mid-September, Indonesia’s
Ambassador to the U.S. Dino Patti Djalal resigned his post in a bid to win
selection as the 2014 presidential candidate for the Democratic Party.
Another hopeful, out of 11 Democratic Party contenders, was Trade Minister
Gita Wirjawan, joining General Pramono Edhie Wibowo, former army chief
of staff and brother-in-law of the president.
Although the armed forces has taken a back seat in the post-reformasi era, it
is especially noteworthy that prior to departing for a visit to Europe in March
2013, President Yudhoyono cited intelligence reports claiming that ‘‘uniden-
tified parties’’ were seeking to take advantage of the political crisis plaguing
his Democratic Party to disrupt the work of government. Immediately upon
his return, the president went into a series of closed-door meetings with
retired military generals, Prabowo included. Coup rumors aside, it is credible,
as one journalist speculated, that certain retired generals feared the prospect
of Indonesia ratifying the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(ICC), thereby leaving themselves vulnerable to the charge of crimes against
5. Markus Junianto Sihalolo, Robertus Wardi, and Anastasia Wienanti Resardhy, ‘‘Election
Shaping up as Battle of the Tribes,’’ Jakarta Globe, July 6, 2013, <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/
news/election-shaping-up-as-battle-of-the-tribes/>.
6. Muhamad Al Azhari, Gabriel Kereh, and Alisha Kusuma Oceani, ‘‘Prabowo Maps out Plans
for the Future,’’ ibid., May 30, 2013, <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/prabowo-maps-out-
plans-for-the-future-2/>.
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humanity.7 No less damaging to the image of Indonesian military profession-
alism was the March 23 execution-style revenge killing of four ‘‘gangster’’
detainees in a central Java penitentiary by an eight-member Kopassus squad
in a virtual commando operation. Besides concerns for the probity of the
military tribunal that on September 5 passed sentences on the Kopassus 8, the
National Commission on Human Rights (Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manu-
sia, Komnas HAM) also raised the question of possible complicity in the affair
by even higher ranking Kopassus officers.8
Tolerance/Intolerance
Notwithstanding Indonesia’s plural culture and generally tolerant image,
outbursts of both state and non-state violence continued in 2013. For
instance, having won some success in their own version of the ‘‘war on
terror,’’ the police themselves emerged as targets of numerous acts of violence
committed in locations across Java by ‘‘unidentified gunmen.’’ The bombing
at the Ekayana Buddhist Temple in West Jakarta––in an apparent riposte by
Muslim militants officially described as ‘‘terrorists’’ to the persecution of
Rohingya Muslims in predominantly Buddhist Myanmar––was another case
in point. Among other sectarian acts of violence, in August, Shiite Muslims in
Madura, an island northeast of Java that is part of East Java Province, were
given an ultimatum to convert to Sunnism or leave the island. The campaign
appeared to be carried out with the support of the local government, the
police, the Indonesian Ulema [Clerics] Council (Majelis Ulema Indonesia,
MUI, the nation’s top Muslim clerical body), as well as the national govern-
ment’s National Unity and Political Agency (Kesbangpol).9
The hardline Islamic Defenders Front was seldom absent from the news,
resorting to violence in raids on brothels and staging protests against beauty
contests. These acts provoked threats of legal action by the authorities, but
there was little follow-through. The tense situation inside Papua Province,
7. Bagus BT Saragih, ‘‘SBY Suspected of Discussing Rights Abuses with Ex-generals,’’ Jakarta Post,
March 14, 2013, <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/03/14/sby-suspected-discussing-rights-
abuses-with-ex-generals.html>; and Bagus BT Saragih and Margareth S. Aritonang, ‘‘Govt Closes
Ranks on Coup Paranoia,’’ ibid., March 23, 2013.
8. Ina Parlina, ‘‘Role of Kopassus Leaders ‘Must Be Probed’,’’ ibid., June 20, 2013, <http://www.
thejakartapost.com/news/2013/06/20/role-kopassus-leaders-must-be-probed.html>.
9. Camelia Pasandaran, ‘‘Madura Shiites Face Conversion Threat,’’ Jakarta Globe, August 13,
2013, <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/madura-shiites-face-conversion-threat/>.
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which occupies the western portion of the island of New Guinea, also drew
the attention of the U.N. Human Rights Committee (UNHRC). The
agency reminded Indonesia of its obligations under the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, also highlighting the excessive use of force
by government security forces, including a ‘‘high number of extrajudicial
killings’’ over the past two years and the use of violence in dispersing peaceful
protests.10
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTS
In Indonesia, as in much of Southeast Asia, China’s economic slowdown in
2013 began to translate into reduced prices for major export items, including
sales of natural resources led by coal and palm oil. Notably, in the third
quarter, the gross domestic product (GDP) grew 5.6% over the same quarter
in the previous year, the slowest growth since the fourth quarter of 2009; the
World Bank trimmed its forecast for economic growth for 2013 to 5.6% from
a previous estimate of 6.2%. With growth slowing, annual inflation mean-
while rose to 8.4% in November. Falling nearly 25% since the beginning of
the year, the rupiah (Rp) bottomed out against the dollar, reaching its lowest
level in four years, at Rp 11,987 to the dollar in mid-December.11 China,
Japan, and South Korea, respectively, signed currency swap agreements with
Indonesia to defend the rupiah against capital flight. According to the Badan
Pusat Statistik (Central Statistics Agency, BPS), exports fell 4.5% in June
from the previous year. Imports dropped 6.8% in the same period, leading to
a trade deficit of $847 million. Owing to improvements in the third quarter,
however, Bank Indonesia (BI) was more sanguine as to economic growth
reaching 5.5%–5.9%.
Although foreign direct investment (FDI) rose 18.9% in the second quarter
from a year earlier, impressive in itself, this was still the slowest pace since
10. ‘‘Rights Groups Slam Continued Use of Force, Impunity in Papua,’’ ibid., July 17, 2013,
<http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/rights-groups-slam-continued-use-of-force-impunity-in-
papua/>.
11. ‘‘Indonesia’s Economy: Tipping the Balance: Politics, So How Long Can the Bright Economics
Last?’’ Economist, February 23, 2013, <http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21572245-gloomy-politics-
so-how-long-can-bright-economics-last-tipping-balance>; ‘‘Indonesia’s Economy Slipping: A Rise in
Economic Nationalism Compounds Broader Worries about South-East Asia’s Giant,’’ ibid., August
24, 2013, <http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21584032-rise-economic-nationalism-compounds-
broader-worries-ab>.
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2010, a major turnaround from the previous buoyant cycle.12 Mining and
transportation continued to attract most investment. Among FDI sources,
Japan dominated, contributing $2.3 billion, 17.39% of the total in the first six
months of 2013, up 16.2% from the same period the previous year. Toyota
Motor Corporation committed $2.7 billion to expand production facilities in
Indonesia. More generally, corporate Japan has rediscovered in Indonesia
a niche among a younger and relatively affluent demographic that is also
swayed by the lure of Japan’s ‘‘soft power,’’ especially in consumer items and
prestige brands.13
With corruption still a major bane upon Indonesian society and economics,
2013 was singular: a number of high profile judicial cases appear to have tested
the limits of official impunity. On September 4, the Jakarta Anti-Corruption
Court sentenced former National Police Traffic Corps Inspector-General Djo-
ko Susilo to 10 years in prison in a corruption case involving $18 million, the
largest known accumulation of wealth by a corruption suspect to date.14 In the
same month, the retired chief of the Jakarta military command was sentenced
to four years in prison for embezzling Rp 17.6 billion ($1.5 million) while
heading the Brawijaya Command. The following month it was the turn of
newly installed Constitutional Court Chief Justice Akil Mochtar, who was
arrested over allegations of bribery linked to electoral fraud, and amid much
hand-wringing was cashiered by the president. Then, Governor Ratu Atut
Chosiyah of Banten Province near Jakarta and her political dynasty came under
KPK scrutiny. Separately, Jakarta Governor Jokowi launched his own cam-
paign against fraudulent practices within the bureaucracy.
Still, these cases may be the tip of the iceberg, especially with highly
corrupt local cabals and rent-seekers spawned by post-reformasi regional
autonomy. These have been linked to political parties, businesses, organized
crime groups, and security forces. According to the Supreme Audit Agency,
such corruption has led to state losses of $218.5 million in public funds since
12. Novrida Manurung, ‘‘Economy Set to Slow as Inflation Bites,’’ Jakarta Globe, August 1, 2013,
<http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/economy-set-to-slow-as-inflation-bites/>.
13. ‘‘Indonesia Becoming Core Japanese Investment Destination,’’ Jakarta Post, July 23, 2013,
<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/07/23/indonesia-becoming-core-japanese-investment-
destination>; Amgela Dewan, ‘‘Japanese Culture Grips Indonesia as Firms Flood In,’’ Japan Times,
September, 1, 2013, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/09/01/national/japanese-culture-grips-
indonesia-as-firms-flood-in/#.UjzimX-uGH0>.
14. See Geoffrey C. Gunn, ‘‘Indonesia in 2012: An Electoral Democracy in Full Spate,’’ Asian
Survey 53:1 (January/February 2013), p. 120.
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2008.15 Illegal mining of thermal coal, amounting to tax losses of $460 million
a year, also attracted the attention of the KPK.16
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
In mid-June 2013, the continuing problem of cross-border ‘‘haze’’ triggered
by burning fires linked with plantations in southern Sumatra set off a major
diplomatic spat with Singapore, which was worst affected, as well as Malaysia.
On the defensive, Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa asserted that the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) should collaborate to
address the situation, rather than lay blame. Indonesia has still not ratified
the ASEAN trans-boundary haze pollution treaty, which it signed in 2002.
Amid acrimony, on June 24, President Yudhoyono issued an apology to
Singapore and Malaysia for the damaging fires, citing both human and
natural factors and calling for an inquiry. On June 7, in an unprecedented
act, the Indonesian president visited the Rainbow Warrior, the flagship of the
Greenpeace organization docked in Jakarta Harbor, and pledged expanded
environmental protection. On May 13, the president had signed a two-year
extension to a logging moratorium, part of a $1 billion bilateral deal with
Norway to reduce the impact of logging on Indonesia’s forests. Meeting with
Hollywood star Harrison Ford in mid-September, Yudhoyono vigorously
defended his administration’s environmental credentials.
U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, meeting his Indonesian counterpart
Purnomo Yusgiantoro in Singapore on June 1, indicated that in line with U.S.
President Barack Obama’s ‘‘pivot’’ to the Pacific region, Washington would
step up its military cooperation with Indonesia.17 Visiting Jakarta on August 26,
Hagel announced that the U.S. had closed a deal for Indonesia to buy eight
AH-64E Apache attack helicopters for some $500 million, the largest-ever
military sale between the two countries. Although Washington underscored
the importance of respect for human rights as a prerequisite for deeper military
ties, no conditions were attached to the use of the helicopters.
15. Yeremia Sukoyo and Usmin, ‘‘With Decentralized Power Comes Graft,’’ Jakarta Globe, July
22, 2013, <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/with-decentralized-power-comes-graft/>.
16. ‘‘Indonesia Laments US$5b in Lost Coal,’’ South China Morning Post, October 4, 2013.
17. ‘‘U.S. Pledges to Step up Military Ties with Indonesia,’’ Agence France-Presse, Jakarta Globe,
June 1, 2013, <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/us-pledges-to-step-up-military-ties-with-
indonesia/>.
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Still, Indonesia outsources its military needs from a number of countries,
not excluding Russia and China. According to one report, Jakarta is in the
process of procuring 16 Russian Sukhoi-class fighter jets (the two most recent
were Su-30 Mk2s), 17 patrol vessels, three light frigates, and an undisclosed
number of tanks and missiles, part of a $15 billion five-year plan to modernize
the military.18
Visiting Jakarta in January, Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo talked
up trade and investment while pledging aid to clean up the then-flooded
capital. On the diplomatic front, Abe sought to underscore analogies between
China’s maritime claims and its expansion in the South China and East
China Seas. With Australia, counterterrorism and people smuggling domi-
nated official discussions. Visiting Jakarta in July, then-Australian Labor
Prime Minister Kevin Rudd gained Indonesia’s agreement to stop issuing
visas to Iranians seeking illegal entry into Australia. Nevertheless, Indonesian
Foreign Minister Natalegawa rejected key elements of the incoming Austra-
lian conservative government’s policies on people smuggling as prone to
‘‘undermine’’ Indonesia’s sovereignty. Visiting Jakarta on October 1, his first
overseas visit as prime minister, Liberal Party leader Tony Abbott, Rudd’s
successor, gained a concession to treat the problem as a strictly bilateral issue.
However, relations chilled in mid-November when international media
exposed revelations that in 2009 Australian intelligence agencies intercepted
mobile telephone conversations of Indonesia’s president and his wife, along
with those of senior ministers. Indignant, Jakarta abruptly withdrew its
ambassador from Canberra, suspended a range of bilateral agreements includ-
ing those relating to military intelligence sharing and people smuggling, and
demanded an apology. At this writing, the saga continues as the two sides––
erstwhile ‘‘strategic partners’’––continue to work out a code of conduct
guiding future ties. Even so, it is clear that Jakarta, not Canberra, is setting
the agenda and timing for the full resumption of relations.
More than any other event, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
forum summit held in Bali (October 5–8) placed Indonesia alongside China in
the spotlight. On October 3, even prior to attending the summit, Chinese
President Xi Jinping made headlines as the first foreign leader to address the
Indonesian Parliament, also signing a series of economic agreements including
18. Yuliasri Perdani, ‘‘Jakarta Dialogue Aims at Easing Tension in Asia,’’ Jakarta Post, March 21, 2013,
<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/03/21/jakarta-dialogue-aims-easing-tension-asia.html>.
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a currency-swap deal. Xi and Yudhoyono also agreed to upgrade the bilateral
relationship to ‘‘comprehensive strategic partnership’’ status. With Yudhoyono
also hosting bilateral meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin, South
Korean President Park Geun-hye, Japan’s Abe, and others, it was left to the
U.S.’s visiting Kerry to explain President Obama’s absence. Notwithstanding
China’s small diplomatic triumph, as Marty Natelegawa declared on the sum-
mit sidelines, ASEAN unity was not divisible. On the global front at the G20
summit in St. Petersburg on September 6, President Yudhoyono advised his
U.S. counterpart and four other leaders of the U.N. Security Council not to
attack Syria. On October 21–23, in yet another expression of independence in
foreign policy, the Indonesian foreign minister paid a visit to the North Korean
capital, ostensibly to discuss trade cooperation.
More generally, looking back over the Yudhoyono years, Indonesia ree-
merged on both the international and regional stage with expanded prestige
both East and West. Domestically, however, the concentration of wealth and
power in the hands of oligarchs and political tribes continues to frustrate the
efforts of populists and graft-busters alike to enforce the rule of law. They
have also found it hard to set limits upon intolerance and to apply techno-
cratic or managerial solutions to rebuilding infrastructure (with flood-prone
and traffic-congested Jakarta a major case in point). As symbolized by illegal
logging and mining, the court is still out on Indonesian hopes for an envi-
ronmentally sustainable future.
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